EXECUTIVE TALKS

May 19th, 2026

War in the Middle East – Why Energy Infrastructure Is Now on the Frontline

Martin Erath, GM & Head of Middle East, Tractebel-ENGIE

A conversation with Martin Erath, GM & Head of Middle East at TRACTEBEL-ENGIE, on how the war is reshaping energy systems, infrastructure, and project finance across the region—and the opportunities this creates for technology, reconstruction, and regional powers.

1. Personal Perspective

From your personal point of view, what distinguishes the current conflict from previous crises in the Middle East?

Martin Erath: thank you for this important question. In my view, what distinguishes the current US–Iran–GCC conflict from previous Middle East crises is that it breaks the older pattern of controlled, deniable escalation and instead pulls the Gulf directly into open, multidomain confrontation with global economic and great power stakes.

The Gulf region is no longer a rear area—it has become an active battlespace.

Historically, GCC states could host bases yet remain comparatively insulated. That assumption has eroded as missile/drone threats and cyber-attacks extend across all GCC countries targeting critical civilian and strategic infrastructure (energy facilities, ports, desalination plants, data centers, banks, major cities) sits inside the operational theatre.

Looking at this crisis “Neutrality” is harder to sustain in practice. Now, neutrality is shaped less by diplomacy and more by embedded security architecture such multi-layered air defence systems.

Maritime and commerce disruption is central, not incidental. The Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, and Gulf of Oman are core theatres; shipping disruption and blockade/counter threat dynamics mean energy and trade shocks become a primary mechanism of pressure with immediate global spillover.

Great power competition is also now built into the crisis. China and Russia are no longer bystanders; China’s energy security, Iran ties, and deep GCC trade exposure tie the conflict more directly to U.S.–China strategic competition, not just regional politics.

“The Gulf is no longer a safe backyard.

It’s a frontline, and the global economy is directly in the line of fire”

2. Priorities in Crisis Mode

What are your company’s top priorities in an acute crisis situation?
What is your personal priority as a top executive in such circumstances?

Martin Erath: in practice, TRACTEBEL-ENGIE’s crisis response in the GCC typically follows a clear sequence: protect people first, then stabilize power/water operations, then secure sites and systems (physical and cyber), while working in lockstep with sovereign authorities and ring fencing supply chain and financial exposures as the situation evolves.

Hence, top priorities for ENGIE and TRACTEBEL are as follows:

  • People safety and duty of care: activate crisis management teams, tighten HSE/security rules, and implement sheltering/rotation/evacuation protocols for staff and dependents (SIP = Shelter in Place).
  • Continuity of essential power and water services: keep generation and desalination assets running, operate under emergency dispatch, and prioritize critical loads such as strategic infrastructure).
  • Fuel and supply-chain resilience: secure gas and backup fuels, manage chemicals/spares availability, increase inventories where feasible, and plan around port/shipping disruption risks (Hormuz/Red Sea).
  • Stakeholder engagement and alignment: align daily with ministries, grid operators, and authorities; treat operations as strategic infrastructure with reliability prioritized over commercial optimization.
  • Financial and contractual protection: preserve liquidity, document force majeure, manage FX/commodity exposure, and prepare insurance/political-risk positions once operational stability is secured.

For me as part of the executive leadership team my TOP priority is “People safety and duty of care” which is key in our ONE SAFETY culture and HSE excellence agenda.

“Neutrality is a myth.

If you’re plugged into the system, you’re already part of the conflict.”

3. Public–Private Cooperation

How does cooperation between government authorities and private companies work in practice during a crisis?

Martin Erath: this is a very good question as it covers the relationship between public and private companies which depend on each other in such situations. So, looking at the ongoing GCC crisis there are many activities which show how Public-private-cooperation works in practice.

  • They set up a joint crisis “command cell” (government + offtaker/regulator + private operator) that meets daily to make fast operational decisions.

  • The government leads priorities; the operator executes: instructions focus on keeping essential services running (power/water), even if this overrides normal commercial optimization.

  • Emergency powers and security protocols kick in: private sites plug into state security/civil defence rules e.g. SIP – Shelter in Place, and physical + cyber measures are coordinated centrally.

  • Contracts keep running, but flexibility increases: deviations (maintenance deferrals, dispatch changes, construction resequencing) are agreed first to protect continuity, then documented.

  • Costs and disputes are handled later: force majeure and compensation discussions are typically deferred/“netted” after stability returns, often involving insurers, lenders, and sovereign support.

“The era of optimizing energy for cost is over.

Now it’s about survival under fire.”

4. Energy & Geopolitics

How does the current conflict affect the planning and operation of energy infrastructure?

Martin Erath: there are many take-aways we see in this ongoing crisis:

  • Operations shift to emergency reliability mode: continuity of electricity and water becomes the overriding objective; dispatch and fuel choices can override normal economic merit order, and noncritical work is deferred.

  • Security becomes an operating condition: sites run with tightened access control, lower on-site staffing, hardened control rooms/substations, and closer integration with state security and air-defence coordination for critical civilian assets.

  • Higher disruption tolerance is designed in: planners prioritize redundancy, manual fallback, shorter restart times, and distributed/modular configurations over large centralized single points of failure.

  • Fuel, export, and logistics assumptions are rewritten: chokepoint disruption (e.g., Hormuz) is treated as equivalent to production loss, driving more on-site storage, fuel-switch capability, alternative routing, and contingency inventories.

  • Investment sequencing changes: fewer outright cancellations, but more tender extensions and schedule delays; priority shifts toward grid stability, black-start/reserves, desalination-linked capacity, and domestic resilience assets.

  • Risk allocation and finance tighten: force majeure provisions, insurance availability/pricing, and sovereign support become central inputs to project structure and operating decisions.

In my opinion and what we can anticipate based on recent client meetings is that the conflict likely turns “geopolitical risk” into a day-to-day design and operational constraint—so the GCC energy system is run and expanded for resilience, redundancy, and rapid recovery ahead of lowest-cost optimization.

5. Impact on the Energy Transition

Do geopolitical conflicts accelerate the shift from fossil fuels to more resilient, renewable energy systems – or do they rather slow it down?

Martin Erath: well, the short answer is Both, but not at the same time, and not everywhere. In my opinion geopolitical conflicts like the current US–Iran–Israel typically slow the transition in the short term (security-of-supply first), but accelerates it over time by turning renewables, storage, and electrification into resilience and energy-security infrastructure rather than “climate-only” projects.

  • Short term (months to ~2 years): tends to slow the energy transition as governments extend/lean on fossil generation, fast-track LNG or liquid fuels, and divert capital to emergency measures and security.

  • Medium to long term (3–15 years): tends to accelerate new policies and investors reduce exposure to imported fuels and chokepoints by scaling solar/wind, storage, grids, efficiency, and electrification.

The transition shifts in “shape” with more focus on domestic energy autonomy, modular/distributed assets, and faster-build technologies; less tolerance for single-point-of-failure mega-assets.

Winners expand beyond renewables and grid resilience, batteries, demand response, interconnections, and firm low-carbon options (where acceptable) rise in priority.

Net effect depends on capacity, i.e. countries with strong institutions/finance can accelerate after the shock; fragile systems risk prolonged delay.

“Capital doesn’t chase returns anymore.

It runs away from risk and hides in geopolitical safe havens.”

6. Technology & Resilience

Which technologies gain particular importance in the context of such conflicts?

Martin Erath: I think that renewable energy technologies will gain in importance. The bottom line here is that such technologies that are modular, quickly deployable, fuel independent (where possible), islandable, and cyber secure become mission-critical—so resilience value often outweighs lowest-cost operation.

To be more specific I can see the following trends and technologies in future:

  • Distributed renewables (especially solar PV) to reduce dependence on imported fuels and keep critical sites powered locally.

  • Battery energy storage (BESS) for fast backup power, frequency support, black-start support, and “solar plus storage” resilience.

  • Fuel-flexible and fast-start generation (dual-fuel turbines/engines, demand response, standby generation) to bridge disruption when fuels or grids are unstable.

  • Stronger interconnections and redundancy to improve resilience (such as the GCC interconnected system, just recalling our recent management meetings with GCCIA which we have been advising over the last couple of years.

7. Project Financing

How are financing conditions for energy and infrastructure projects evolving under these circumstances?

Martin Erath: this is quite difficult to answer as project financing here in the region is covered mostly through local banks, in certain cases supported by international lenders.

What we see is that financing is still available for GCC energy and infrastructure, but it is becoming more expensive, more selective, and more conservative in structure. The key shift is that lenders (often local GCC banks) increasingly fund projects that are sovereign-aligned and resilience-critical, while pushing more risk back to sponsors/contractors for projects with higher exposure to geopolitics, logistics, or merchant revenues.

So possible trends can be:

  • Pricing moving up with higher margins/fees and less aggressive bank competition.

  • Tenors and leverage tighten with shorter or more sculpted tenors, higher DSCR and reserve requirements, and more conservative base-case assumptions.

  • Documentation and risk allocation harden considering war-risk/force majeure treatment and insurance becoming central diligence items; EPC and supply-chain contingencies are priced more explicitly.

  • Flight to “strategic” projects: contracted, government-offtake assets (IPP/IWPP/grid/water) and resilience investments (storage, grid reinforcement) stay bankable; merchant and chokepoint-exposed projects slow down.

  • More state-anchored capital mix with local banks remain the anchor lenders in the GCC, with DFIs/ECAs/SWFs increasingly used to de-risk or crowd-in confidence where needed.

“For Europe, the energy transition is no longer a climate project.

It’s a geopolitical survival strategy.”

8. Capital Flows

Are global capital flows shifting due to the current geopolitical situation? Is capital becoming scarcer – or simply more selective?

Martin Erath: simply speaking: the current geopolitical crisis is not draining global capital, it is forcing capital to choose. Assets that reduce systemic risk continue to attract funding; those that amplify it struggle.

Capital is more selective rather than truly scarcer—capital is still available, but it is flowing to safer jurisdictions and economies, resilience critical assets, while projects with higher geopolitical, merchant, or supply chain risks face higher pricing, tighter terms, or certain delays.

9. Middle East

Will the region’s energy orientation and business model undergo lasting changes as a result of this conflict?

Martin Erath: good question. Knowing the qualities, mindset of the regional leadership in the GCC I can imagine that the Iran–US–Israel conflict is not ending the Gulf’s energy era; it is transforming it from a production‑led model into a resilience‑led, system‑oriented energy economy — with different pathways across UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman.

So, the region’s energy orientation and business model are likely to change in lasting ways. The core shift is from maximising export volume and low-cost production toward maximising resilience, redundancy, controllability, and domestic system value (while remaining a major hydrocarbon exporter).

Energy is a national security infrastructure, it will see higher spendings on protection, redundancy, spares, and emergency operations.

Energy transition will continue in gigawatt scaling considering renewables, storage, grids, and efficiency gain importance as “domestic supply insurance,” not just climate policy.

We can also expect more domestic value creation with a stronger push into petrochemicals, electrified industry, power‑water integration, and system services (flexibility/ancillary services).

10. Europe’s Role

What strategic role should Europe assume in this environment going forward?

Martin Erath: touching this sensitive topic I would like to answer with a general request:

Europe should move from being a reactive energy consumer to a strategic stabilizer by reducing its own exposure through faster system transition, while coordinating markets and partnerships to dampen global shocks.

Just a few examples on this topic:

  • Stabilize at home by cutting oil and gas vulnerability via electrification, efficiency, renewables, storage, and grids—treating transition as security.

  • Be a market shock manager by using regulation and diplomacy to reduce volatility (shipping, insurance, fuel products), and keep global energy markets functioning.

  • Build pragmatic partnerships by deepening cooperation with the Gulf and other producers on resilience, power systems, and low-carbon fuels.


Europe should take the lead by offering a replicable model, demonstrating that energy security improves most when demand and infrastructure are redesigned, not when dependence is merely shifted to new suppliers.

“If Europe doesn’t act as a coordinated energy and security player, it risks becoming a price-taker in a world shaped by the US and China.”

11. Winners and Losers

Who are the long-term winners and losers of these developments?

Martin Erath: in my opinion this conflict accelerates a global sorting process as it rewards energy‑secure, system‑oriented, and adaptable economies on the one hand and penalizes those reliant on fragile chokepoints, imported fuels, and macro‑vulnerability on the other.

So, likely long‑term winners are:

  • Energy‑secure exporters outside major chokepoints (benefit from a persistent risk premium and demand for “safe” supply).

  • Countries with strong domestic power systems (higher electrification, more renewables/nuclear, stronger grids) that are less exposed to oil and shipping shocks.

  • Energy‑transition and resilience industries which cover renewables, batteries, grids, OT cybersecurity, and critical‑infrastructure protection.

  • States with fiscal/financial buffers that can absorb volatility and keep investing through shocks.

Long‑term losers are likely:

  • Energy‑import‑dependent economies facing repeated inflation shocks, weaker trade balances, and competitiveness pressure.

  • Countries and sectors dependent on fragile chokepoints (Hormuz/Red Sea/Suez) and just‑in‑time shipping models.

  • Low‑income, highly indebted states where energy/food price spikes translate quickly into fiscal and social stress.

It is worth to highlight here that adjusting strategies and policies on resilience and diversification determine whether they end up net winners or losers.

12. Role of TRACTEBEL & ENGIE

Can the massive destruction of civilian infrastructure and the resulting emissions in current conflicts be aligned with sustainable, climate-compatible reconstruction efforts?
What specific role does ENGIE & Tractebel aim to play in this context?

Martin Erath: thank you for these two interesting questions. Well, let me answer one by one.

Q1)  Can massive destruction and war-related emissions be aligned with sustainable, climate-compatible reconstruction?

The answer is Yes, but not automatically. It works only if “build back better” principles are applied from day one, not added later.

Rebuild systems, not assets which means to redesign power–water–transport as an integrated system (redundancy, decentralisation, faster repair), rather than replacing damaged assets like-for-like.

Prioritise “quick wins” that are also green such as solar + batteries for critical services, efficiency upgrades, and modular solutions can restore services fast while lowering long-term emissions.

Cut embodied carbon in rebuilding low-carbon cement/steel, reuse/recycling of debris, and modern building standards prevent reconstruction itself from becoming the largest emissions source.

Lock in governance and finance conditions: donor/IFI requirements, procurement rules, and measurement (MRV) need to reward resilience and decarbonisation together.

Q2) What specific role do ENGIE & Tractebel aim to play in this context?

ENGIE is one of the TOP market leaders accelerating the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy.  ENGIE’s business model is based on 4 core businesses to build tomorrow’s low-carbon energy system and achieve the Net Zero Carbon target by 2045 for the Group and its customers.

Hence, it will continue to actively drive this agenda on all levels, worldwide. This means design, build, finance, deliver, and operate decentralized low-carbon energy solutions (renewables, storage, hybrid systems) that keep critical services running during disruption and reduce long-term emissions to become the best utility in the energy transition by 2030.

Tractebel, being part of ENGIE Group and market leader in PMC/Engineering/Consulting and Advisory with its 6,000 experts in 40 countries, will act as the system architect and enabler, providing master planning and front-end engineering, PPP advisory, and PMC services to rebuild integrated power–water–and city infrastructure assets and transportation systems that are resilient and climate-compatible.

Target

Be the best utility in the energy transition by 2030

A Major Challenge

Supply customers who request it with 24/7 carbon-free electricity

2030 ambitions

95 GW of renewable production and storage capacity in 2030

20 TWh of local green energy production in 2030

10 TWh of biomethane production in 2030

4 GW of hydrogen production in 2035

50 TWh of biomethane capacity connected to French networks in 2030

10,000 km of electricity transmission networks in 2030

300 TWh of electricity sales in 2030 (B2B and B2C)

About Martin Erath

GM & Head of Middle East, TRACTEBEL-ENGIE

Martin Erath is a senior executive with over 30 years of experience in the energy, infrastructure, and utilities sectors. Since 2025, he has been leading Tractebel-ENGIE’s operations in the Middle East, overseeing activities across the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait. He has spent more than 22 years living and working in the Middle East, building deep regional expertise across energy, water, and infrastructure projects. His career includes senior leadership roles at Siemens, GOPA Consulting Group, and ILF, with responsibilities spanning project delivery, transactions, and advisory. Martin has been involved in large-scale EPC and PPP programs, including power, renewables, and urban infrastructure, with project volumes reaching up to USD 10 billion.